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2851 CASE NOTES 285 
Military Law - COURTS-MARTIAL - RECENT CASES DEFINING THE 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL BEFORE SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL 
In June, 1972, the United States Supreme Court expanded the sixth 
amendment right to counsel by holding in Argersinger u. Hamlinl that 
absent a valid waiver no one could be imprisoned for even a "minor" 
offense unless he had been assisted by counsel at trial.2 The Navy and 
Marine Corps considered this expansion inapplicable to summary courts- 
martial,3 thereby leaving marines and sailors to be tried, convicted, and 
sentenced to confinement for minor offenses without a right to appointed 
counsel. Several such convictions were challenged in the federal courts 
and the Court of Military  appeal^,^ but conflicting rulings resulted. The 
Court of Military Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held Argersinger applicable to all summary courts-martial,5 thus guar- 
anteeing servicemen a right to counsel before confinement may be im- 
posed. The  Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding 
both the sixth amendment and the Argersinger ruling inapplicable to 
summary courts-martial and prescribing its own version of a right to 
counsel in summary courts-martial based on fifth amendment due pro- 
'407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
2Zd. at 37. 
3The summary, special, and general courts-martial comprise the military trial court system. 
The summary court differs from the other two in that it may try only those servicemen who 
are not officers, cadets, or midshipmen, and may adjudge only those sentences equivalent to, 
or less than, one month's confinement. While the special and general courts-martial are com- 
posed of either a military judge or a panel of officers, the summary court-martial consists of a 
single commissioned officer. In either the general or special court-martial the accused is 
provided with defense counsel by military law; in the summary court-martial one has had no 
such established right. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 16-27, 10 U.S.C. $0 816-27 
(1970) [hereinafter cited as U.C.M. J.] . 
4This case note considers four cases that challenged the Navy's position. Daigle v. Warner, 
348 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Hawaii 1972), rev'd, 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1973); Henry v. Warner, 357 
F. Supp. 495 (C.D. Cal. 1973), vacated, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom.  
Middendorf v. Henry, 95 S. Ct. 173 (1974) (No. 74-175); Betonie v. Sizemore, 369 F. Supp. 340 
(M.D. Fla. 1973), aff 'd i n  part and rev'd i n  part, 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298,46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). 
The factual settings in the three federal court cases were similar: enlisted members of the 
Navy and Marine Corps were tried and sentenced to confinement by summary courts-martial 
without the right to counsel. Their sentences were then challenged in the federal courts by 
petitions for writs of habeas corpus, thereby directly presenting the question of the applic- 
ability of Argersinger to summary courts-martial. 
In the military case, the Court of Military Appeals considered the admissibility of evidence 
of a previous summary court-martial conviction, which had been obtained without the assist- 
ance of counsel, in determining the sentence to be imposed following a special court-martial 
conviction. This setting indirectly required the court to determine the applicability of Arger- 
singer to the military. 
Wnited States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973); Betonie v. Sizemore, 
496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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cess grounds.6 As a result of the Ninth Circuit's position on the right-to- 
counsel issue, the case of Middendorfv. Henry' is on appeal to the Su- 
preme Court, presenting that Court with its first opportunity to decide 
whether the Constitution guarantees a right to counsel to servicemen be- 
fore summary courts-martial.8 
A. The Right to Counsel in Civilian Courts 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution declares that 
"in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. " The meaning of this provision 
has developed throughout our history, with much of the significant inter- 
pretation dating from 1932 when, in Powell v. Alabama,g the Supreme 
Court held that due process of law1o requires the states to provide an 
accused with the assistance of counsel in capital cases.ll Then, in John- 
son v. Zerbst,l2 the Court construed the sixth amendment to mean that 
no federal criminal conviction can stand unless the accused had, or 
waived, the assistance of counsel. In 1963, the Court held in Gideon v. 
Wainwright13 that the right to the assistance of counsel is a fundamental 
right which is essential to a fair trial,l4 and that due process is violated if 
6Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1973); Henry v. Warner, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 
1974), cert. granted sub nom. Middendorf v. Henry, 95 S. Ct. 173 (1974) (No. 74-175). 
'95 S. Ct. 173 (1974) (No. 74-175) (J. William Middendorf I1 has replaced John E. Warner 
as Secretary of the Navy, and the title of the case has therefore been changed from Warner v.  
Henry.). 
8The case was argued before the Court on January 22, 1975. 43 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. 1975). 
9287 US. 45 (1932). 
1OThe right to counsel was applied to the states through the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 7 1. 
"The Court also emphasized the importance of the assistance of counsel: 
The  right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend 
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . He requires the guiding hand of counsel at 
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces 
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 
Id. at 68-69. 
12304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
'3372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
l4The Court stated: 
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and 
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our 
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and 
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which 
every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the 
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. 
Id. at 344. 
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a state felony conviction is obtained without the accused's having had the 
right to appointed counsel at trial.15 
The Supreme Court's holding in Argersinger added a new but con- 
sistent dimension to this historical development. In Argersinger, the 
Court held that due process requires that no person may be imprisoned 
for any offense unless he is represented by counsel at trial.16 
B. T h e  Right to Counsel i n  Military Courts 
The right to counsel in the military courts has closely paralleled the 
civilian right, not because the civilian standards control in the military, 
but because Congress has evidenced an intent to conform military law as 
closely as possible to the standards of civilian courts.l7 The Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) directs that defense counsel must be 
appointed for all accused before general and special courts-martia1,lg 
the military trial courts which have exclusive jurisdiction of all felony 
and the more serious misdemeanor cases.lg The UCMJ makes no provi- 
sions, however, for the appointment of counsel in summary courts- 
martial, where less serious offenses are tried, even though these courts 
may impose sentences of up to 30 days ~ o n f i n e m e n t . ~ ~  It is this potential 
of confinement without the right to appointed counsel that has raised the 
issue of the applicability of Argersinger to trials by summary courts- 
martial. 
C. T h e  Relationship of Civilian to Military Courts 
Direct application of Argersinger to the military courts is inhibited 
because of the unique status of military jurisprudence. The military 
judicial system has its constitutional base in article 1, where Congress is 
granted express powers over the land and naval forces.21 Pursuant to 
its power to make rules for the regulation of the armed forces, Congress 
l5The Court confirmed its decision in Powell that the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment incorporates the sixth amendment's guarantee of a right to counsel. Id .  at 841 -42. 
16407 U.S. at 37. 
All four of these cases - Powell, Johnson, Gideon, and Argersinger - involved settings in 
which defense counsel was permitted, but not provided. Only those who could not afford 
counsel were denied it. 
The Argersinger holding allowed for "knowing and intelligent" waivers of the right to 
counsel therein defined. This case note assumes that the same qualification would accompany 
an application of Argersinger to military procedure. 
l7Several of the 1968 Amendments to the UCMJ were for the express purpose of conforming 
military criminal procedure more closely to that of federal district courts. S. RJZP. NO. 1601, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 10, 11 (1968). 
lsU.C.M.J. art. 27, 10 U.S.C. 5 827 (1970). 
l9U.C.M.J. arts. 18-19, 10 U.S.C. 55 818-19 (1970). 
20U.C.M.J. art. 20, 10 U.S.C. 5 820 (1970). 
21U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8 provides: "The Congress shall have Power. . . T o  make Rules for 
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. . . ." 
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has provided the military with its own code of lawz2 and judicial ~ystem,~3 
including its own "supreme court," the Court of Military Appeals 
(COMA).24 Hence, the military judicial system is separate and distinct 
from the federal judiciary.25 
In this structural aspect of the military-federal relationship, the mili- 
tary judicial system stands vis-i-vis the federal judiciary in a position 
similar to that of any state judicial system. But in the interactional aspect, 
there are important differences between the military-federal and the state- 
federal relationships. For example, the federal and state systems are 
often alternative adjudicatory forums,26 with each commonly interpret- 
ing the other's laws. Furthermore, state convictions are subject to federal 
habeas corpus r ev i e~ ,~7  and direct appeal is available from final state 
supreme court decisions to the United States Supreme Court." By con- 
trast, the only direct link between the military and the federal judicial 
systems is limited habeas corpus review of military decisions by the 
federal c0urts.~9 
22The Uniform Code of Military Justice was enacted to cover "both the substantive and the 
procedural law governing military justice and its administration in all of the armed forces of 
the United States." S. REP. NO. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. l(1949). All persons in the military, 
and some who are not, are subject to the Uniform Code. U.C.M.J. art. 2, 10 U.S.C. 8 802 
(1970). T h e  UCMJ applies in all places. U.C.M.J. art. 5, 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1970). 
23The military judicial system includes a unique set of trial courts. U.C.M.J. art. 16, 10 
U.S.C. 5 816 (1970). See also note 3 supra. In addition, the military has a separate bar. See, 
e.g., U.C.M.J. art. 27, 10 U.S.C. 5 827 (1970), which requires that counsel appointed for a 
general court-martial be certified by the Judge Advocate General. 
For the purposes of this case note, the most distinctive aspect of the military judicial system 
is its scheme of appellate review. U.C.M.J. arts. 59-76, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859-76 (1970). Essentially 
the appellate review system can be divided into two parts: one administrative and one judicial. 
The  administrative part is performed first. I t  involves review of the court-martial record first 
by the convening authority, and then by the office of the Judge Advocate General of the 
service involved. There is also the possibility of petitioning the Secretary of one's service or the 
President for redress. The second part is the judicial, consisting of review by a Court of Mili- 
tary Review and finally appeal to the Court of Military Appeals. The judicial review is only 
provided for those cases involving an officer or some serious sentence, e.g., a sentence to con- 
finement for 1 year or more. Hence, one convicted by a summary court-martial has no statutory 
right to judicial review. For a discussion of this lack of judicial review of summary court- 
martial convictions, its consequences, and possible remedies, see 1974 UTAH L. b v .  612. 
24Appellate review by the Court of Military Appeals is final - "binding upon all depart- 
ments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States. . . ." U.C.M. J. art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 
(1970); see S. REP. NO. 486,81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 ,6  (1949). 
T h e  Supreme Court and Congress agree that this provision does permit, however, a limited 
habeas corpus review by civilian courts. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953); S. b ~ .  NO. 
486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1949). See also note 29 infra. 
25See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,140 (1 953). 
26This "alternative" relationship is illustrated by the fact that cases properly in state court 
can be removed to federal court. 28 U.S.C. $5 1441-51 (1970). 
2728 U.S.C. 9 2241 (1970). 
2828 U.S.C. 5 1257 (1970). 
29Traditionally, federal habeas corpus review has been more narrow in military than in 
civil cases, limited to insuring that the military court-martial has exercised proper jurisdiction 
or, at best, has dealt fully and fairly with the allegation raised. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 
CASE NOTES 
A. Should Argersinger and the Sixth Amendment Apply to 
Summary Courts-Martial? 
1. Ninth Circuit's analysis. The Henry case was summarily vacated 
and remanded by the Ninth Circuit3O "under the compulsion" of its 
opinion in the earlier case of Daigle v.  W ~ r n e r . 3 ~  In Daigle the Ninth 
Circuit held the sixth amendment inapplicable to trials by summary 
court-martial after examining what "the framers of the Bill of Rights 
intended." The court reasoned that since the framers meant to recog- 
nize the practice that had developed in colonial America, and since at 
that time no right to counsel as required by Argersinger existed in the 
military, the framers intended no such right.32 The  court did hold, how- 
ever, that courts-martial must afford an accused due process of law as 
guaranteed by the fifth amendment, reasoning that since the fifth 
amendment due process clause is an evolving concept, its applicability 
is not limited by historical practices.33 T o  satisfy due process the court 
analogized to the limited right-tocounsel standard now applied in parole 
or probation revocation proceedings34 and prescribed that in summary 
courts-martial the military need appoint counsel only upon request, and 
(1953). For a discussion of the reasons against such a limited habeas corpus review see Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion on denial of rehearing. Id. at 844. 
SoHenry v. Warner, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom. Middendorf v. 
Henry, 95 S. Ct. 173 (1974) (No. 74-175). 
3l490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1973). 
32Zd. at 363-64. 
33Id. at 364. 
34The Ninth Circuit disregarded the due process aspect of Argersinger where the Supreme 
Court was considering what right to counsel the due process clause guarantees one accused 
by a state of a "petty" offense, and where the Court's holding defines the due process standard. 
407 U.S. at 27-29. 
The Ninth Circuit looked to the standards in juvenile delinquency proceedings and 
probation-revocation hearings for an applicable due process guidepost. I t  considered those 
two because they involved the extent to which due process requires counsel in situations 
where imprisonment "may be imposed but the Sixth Amendment does not apply." 490 F.2d 
at 364. (The standard in juvenile delinquency proceedings was set forth by the Supreme 
Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); the rule for probation-revocation hearings was estab- 
lished in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 41 1 U.S. 778 (1973).) 
The circuit court found Gagnon more applicable than Gault to summary courts-martial 
because (1) servicemen are adults and presumably do not have difficulty presenting a defense 
or mitigating circumstances without the aid of counsel, and (2) summary courts-martial are 
less adversary and accusatory than are juvenile court proceedings, and so need to be informal 
and flexible, as are probation-revocation hearings. 490 F.2d at 365. 
The Supreme Court considered an adult's need for the assistance of counsel in Powell, con- 
cluding that even an "intelligent and educated layman.. . needs the guiding hand of counsel 
at every step in the proceedings against him." See note 11 supra. Furthermore, the Court 
carefully explained the bases of its decision in Gagnon, i.e., there are critical differences be- 
tween criminal trials and probation-revocation hearings; and since a probationer has already 
been convicted of a crime, he has a more limited due process right than the right to counsel 
of an accused in a criminal prosecution. 41 1 U.S. at 788-89 & n.12. 
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then only if it is evident that the accused has a defense or claim of mitigat- 
ing circumstances that cannot be adequately presented without assist- 
ance of c0unsel.3~ 
The Ninth Circuit's strictly historical test for applicability of the sixth 
amendment is improper for two reasons. First, the sixth amendment 
right to counsel, as Chief Justice Burger has noted,36 has been an evolving 
concept in terms of both substance and availability from what it was in 
1791.s7 Although the intent of the amendment's framers may be a 
relevant factor in determining the applicability of today's right to coun- 
sel, that intent cannot reasonably be the sole criterion.38 Second, even if 
the founders did not intend the Bill of Rights to apply to the miniscule 
Army and nonexistent Navy of 1789-1791, as one commentator sug- 
ge~ts ,3~ it does not follow that the founders would have had the same 
opinion had they been dealing with the greatly enlarged armed forces 
and the greatly widened military jurisdiction of today.40 The Supreme 
Court has indicated that a proper application of a constitutional pro- 
vision should involve a consideration of current realities and needs.41 
35490 F.2d at 364-65. 
s6Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 44. 
37E. g., in terms of substance, juvenile court procedures including the representation of an 
accused's interests by multipurpose probation officers or judges were struck down in 1967, 
after having prevailed for over half a century and after having withstood constitutional attack 
in over 40 jurisdictions. The new standard is personal, appointed counsel. In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1 (1967). 
The cases of Powell, Johnson, Gideon, and Argersinger exemplify the evolution in the avail- 
ability of the right to counsel. An indigent accused of a capital offense in state court has had a 
right to counsel only since 1932, while the same man accused of any other felony in state court 
has had a right to counsel only since 1963. 
38The U.S. District Court for Hawaii in Daigle and the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California in Henry recognized that the correct starting point for a determination of 
Argersinger's applicability to military court-martial procedures was an examination of the 
thencurrent right to counsel in the military, rather than the framers' intent. The courts found 
that by the time Argersinger came down the military had recognized the importance of counsel, 
and in fact had provided a right to counsel that in some respects was broader than the civilian 
right. The question for the courts then became one of considering whether the summary court- 
martial procedure generates the same need for counsel the Supreme Court found that state 
misdemeanor trials generate, and weighing against that need the mitigating effect of any 
peculiar needs of the military. Daigle v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 1074, 1078-80 (D. Hawaii 1972); 
Henry v. Warner, 357 F. Supp. 495,503-04 (C.D. Cal. 1973). 
39Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice (pts. I, 11), 72 
HARV. L. h v .  1, 266 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Weiner] . Contra, Henderson, Courts-Martial 
and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. b v .  293 (1957). 
*OWiener, supra note 39, at 302. 
It is interesting to note that while the Ninth Circuit relied for its holding on Wiener's 
historical analysis and accepted his conclusion that the framers intended that the Bill of Rights 
not apply to the military, the court seemed to disregard entirely Wiener's argument that 
changed circumstances have made the original intent immaterial today. 490 F.2d at 364. 
4lIn extending the right to counsel to a postindictment police lineup in United States v. 
Wade, the Supreme Court noted that at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted there were 
no police forces as we know them. However, in recognition of the "realities of modern 
criminal prosecution," the Court has interpreted the sixth amendment guarantee to apply 
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The aberrational aspect of the Ninth Circuit's holding is further 
illustrated by the fact that the five other courts, including COMA, that 
have considered the question have held that the sixth amendment and 
Argersinger apply to military courts-martial.42 
2. T h e  standard deueloped by the Court of Military Appeals. 
COMA is the court Congress established to define military law, and it 
has developed the most appropriate and compelling test for determining 
the applicability of constitutional standards to the military.43 Under 
this COMA test the fully defined constitutional right to counsel, like 
all other constitutional standards announced by the Supreme Court, 
applies in the military system unless the adaptation or restriction of that 
right is required by military peculiarity. This test, unlike the Ninth Cir- 
cuit's standard, properly considers the present status of the right to coun- 
sel in federal and state courts and the current composition and needs of 
the military. 
It is significant that all six of the courts that have considered the ques- 
tion of a right to counsel in military trials weighed the effect of providing 
defense counsel in summary courts-martial on the military's ability to 
perform its unique function. While the courts agreed that military 
peculiarity may require some adaptation in the type of assistance pro- 
vided, none of the six held that the unique aspects of the military and its 
to the "critical" stages of the proceedings. 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). See Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
A good example of this kind of analysis in considering Argersinger's applicability to sum- 
mary courts-martial is the opinion of the U.S. District Court for Florida in Betonie v. Size- 
more, 369 F. Supp. 340, 349-52 (M.D. Fla. 1973). 
42The five courts are the U.S. District Courts for Hawaii, for the Central District of Cali- 
fornia, and for Florida; the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals; and the Court of Military Appeals. 
See note 4 supra. 
43COMA has fashioned the rule that "the protections in the Bill of Rights, except those 
which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to members of our 
armed forces." United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 
(1960); accord, United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). This rule 
has been used to overrule previous military law and require that the accused be afforded the 
opportunity to be present with counsel at the taking of written depositions. United States v. 
Jacoby, supra. COMA used the test again to apply the Supreme Court's ruling in Miranaiz to 
the military and overturn a conviction obtained in violation of the federal court standard. 
United States v. Tempia, supra. 
In updating the UCMJ, Congress has employed essentially the same rule. In  amending 
article 16 of the UCMJ in 1968, Congress adopted a provision modeled after rule 23a of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure with a modification to account for command influence, 
a problem unique to the military community. S. REP. NO. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968). 
The Supreme Court has implicitly sanctioned both the standard and its genesis: The stan- 
dard provides in essence that servicemen have constitutional rights that are to be conditioned 
only when overridden by the unique demands of the military. The Supreme Court agreed in 
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. at 140, 142. 
The same standard is applied by COMA which was established by Congress as the final 
arbiter in this area. See note 24 supra. T h e  Supreme Court has recognized such a balancing 
role for Congress and, by implication, for COMA. Burns v. Wilson, supra at 140-41. 
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judicial system justified the denial of the right to counsel in summary 
court~-martial.~4 
COMA ruled on the applicability of Argersinger in the case of United 
States v.  A l d e r r n ~ n . ~ ~  The court's implementation of its standard for 
determining the applicability of constitutional rights in the military was 
best delineated in Judge Duncan's concurring opinion, where he noted 
that the record contained no evidence of military necessity sufficient to 
warrant nonapplication of the Argersinger standard.46 The court 
found a persuasive argument against the Navy's military-necessity posi- 
tion in the fact that the Army and Air Force had voluntarily applied 
Argersinger to their summary court-martial procedures.47 
3. Policy considerations. Considerations of policy also weigh in favor 
of the applicability of Argersinger to the military courts. The only 
servicemen who can be tried by summary courts-martial are those of 
lowest rank.48 For the most part, they are the youngest in age and the 
newest to the military system. The summary court-martial officer is 
typically a lay officer with no special training in the law, who compares 
quite unfavorably, in terms of ability to insure procedural propriety, 
with the military judges or panels of officers presiding at general and 
special courts-martial.49 Moreover, a conviction by summary court- 
martial creates a criminal record that, in addition to the obvious conse- 
quences, can have significant repercussions in the sentencing following 
any subsequent military misconduct.50 In the summary court-martial, 
44The Ninth Circuit joined the other five courts in rejecting the argument that the affording 
of counsel would adversely affect the military. 490 F.2d at 366. All the courts agreed with 
Judge Duncan's position in Alderman that the Navy had shown no valid necessity for a rule 
against providing counsel. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 303, 46 C.M.R. at 303. The Fifth Circuit 
reasoned that courts-martial and civilian trials are more similar than different, since in either 
a conviction can result in deprivation of liberty, potential social stigma, and significant re- 
percussions in the future. 496 F.2d at 1007. 
Factually the strongest arguments against the Navy's military necessity contention are (1) 
that the Army and Air Force have voluntarily complied with Argersinger, and (2) that the 
Navy itself allows the assistance of privately retained counsel, with no reported claim that it 
limits the effectiveness of summary courts-martial. Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d at 366; see 
note 47 infra. 
4522 U.S.C.M.A. 298,46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). 
461d. at 303,46 C.M.R. at 303. 
47H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY 8 2-309 (1972); Daigle v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 1074 
n.14 (1972); Henry v. Warner, 357 F. Supp. 495 n.1 (1973). The Army ordered the change in 
procedure in DA Message 1012362 dated August 10, 1972, which has been reprinted in T h e  
Army Lawyer, August 1972, at 7. The Air Force directive was AFM 11 1-1 dated August 30, 
1972. 
48U.C.M.J. art. 20, 10 U.S.C. 3 820 (1970). See also note 3 supra. The Betonie court noted 
this fact among its policy considerations favoring the applicability of right-to-counsel safe- 
guards. 369 F. Supp. at 351. 
49See Lermack, Summary and Special Courts-Martial: An Empirical Investigation, 18 ST. 
LOUIS U.L. REV. 329 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lermack]. See also Fidell, T h e  Summary 
Court-Martial: A Proposal, 8 HARV. J .  LEGIS. 571,578-84 (1971). 
50Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate 
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then, one finds the coincidence of the military accused least able to de- 
fend himself being tried by the military court most unsuited to insure 
legal rights with considerable consequences accompanying a conviction. 
Providing the assistance of counsel is the best way to insure that the 
military accused will receive the benefit of the available safeguards neces- 
sary to prevent violation of his rights.51 Just as the right to vote is pre- 
servative of all other rights in our political system,52 so the right to coun- 
sel is determinative of all other legal rights in our judicial system. 
B. Under What Circumstances Should Counsel Be Provided in 
Summary Courts-Martial? 
The opinions considering Argersinger's applicability to the military 
raise additional questions concerning the circumstances under which 
counsel should be provided in summary courts-martial. 
I. T h e  effect of confinement. Because it started from a fifth amend- 
ment due process base and looked to the probation-revocation hearing 
standard as a guidepost, the Ninth Circuit ruled that counsel need be 
appointed only when requested, and then only if it is evident that the 
accused has a defense or a claim of mitigating circumstances that cannot 
be adequately presented without the assistance of counsel. Furthermore, 
the court provided that even this limited right can be denied if required 
by the exigencies of military 0perations.~3 
Argersinger, however, clearly required the appointment of counsel in 
cases in which a sentence of imprisonment would be imposed,54 and 
COMA and the Fifth Circuit found the sentence-of-confinement the 
appropriate trigger for the right to provided counsel in the military set- 
ting. 
2.  T h e  effect of "equivalent punishments." However, in the military, 
the range of sentencing possibilities includes "equivalent punish- 
ments,"55 e.g., hard labor, restriction to limits, and forfeiture of pay, 
into which a possible sentence of confinement can be translated at the 
C o m m .  o n  the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 838 (1962); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 7 75b (rev. ed. 1969). 
5lA recent empirical study of minor courts-martial noted that while servicemen have a 
right to a speedy trial, the greatest danger in the minor trials is a procedure that is too speedy. 
While free continuances are supposed to be the rule, in the 83 minor courts-martial during 1 
month in which the accused were unrepresented by counsel, there was only one continuance 
granted. In the 51 courts-martial where accused were represented by counsel, continuances 
were granted in 87 percent of the cases. 
Even if the accused does not offer a defense, it is important to have counsel for the proper 
presentation of mitigating circumstances. Lermack, supra note 49, at 348, 354-55, 377. 
52Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964), citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
370 (1886). 
53Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d at 364-65. 
s4407 U.S. at 37-40. 
55U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES ll 127 (rev. ed. 1969). 
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court's discretion. Since any of these alternatives is considered adequate 
punishment and each involves deprivation of liberty or property, the 
Argersinger mandate should require defense counsel at a summary court- 
martial before confinement or any of the "equivalent punishments" may 
be imposed. Alternatively, the military could simply provide the right 
to assistance of counsel, unless waived, to all servicemen tried by sum- 
mary courts-martial.56 
3. The efiect of indigency. Because indigency is a normal prerequisite 
to the right to appointed counsel in civilian trials, the United States 
District Court for Florida57 and Judge Quinn of COMA58 included a 
requirement of indigency in their prescription for a right to provided 
counsel in summary courts-martial. But Judge Duncan of COMA 
argued that indigency is irrelevant in the military context.59 The  UCM J 
does not limit the right to appointed counsel to indigents in any other 
context; whenever the benefit of counsel is prescribed for servicemen, 
it is always provided without regard to their financial status.60 Indigency, 
therefore, should not be a precondition on the right to counsel before 
summary courts-martial. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The sixth amendment right to counsel, as extended to minor offense 
trials by Argersinger, should apply in the military's summary courts- 
martial. Under the COMA test for applicability, constitutional stan- 
dards defined by the Supreme Court in both state and federal cases are 
available in the military judicial system unless their adaptation or restric- 
tion is required by military peculiarity. The COMA rationale not only 
mandates application of Argersinger to summary courts-martial, but 
also is well suited for use in the continual process of considering the 
appropriateness of constitutional standards in a military setting because 
it properly balances the accused's rights as a citizen against his duties as 
a soldier. The COMA test and its result in the Argersinger context 
should be upheld by the Supreme Court when it considers the question 
in Middendorfv. Henry. 
56Justice Powell indicated that in his view the majority opinion in Argersinger fore- 
shadows the adoption of a broad rule requiring counsel in all petty offense cases. 407 U.S. at 
52. 
S7Betonie v. Sizemore, 369 F. Supp. at 353. 
58U.S. V. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 300,46 C.M.R. at 300. 
592Z U.S.C.M.A. at 306,46 C.M.R. at 306. 
GOLerrnack, supra note 49, at 368. 
